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Sovereignty and the Southern African
Development Community
Benjamin Sirota*
I. INTRODUCTION
In late August 2003, members of the fourteen-nation Southern African
Development Community ("SADC") convened in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania for
the group's annual summit.' The two-day conference opened with a standing
ovation in honor of embattled Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, who
faces massive poverty, inflation, unemployment, and political opposition in his
2
own country, as well as widespread condemnation from the West. SADC
leaders urged Western nations to lift sanctions on Zimbabwe while declining to
address Mugabe's numerous human rights abuses.3 Recognizing that the US and
the EU have refused to fund projects in which Zimbabwe is involved,
Tanzanian Foreign Minister Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete boldly stated, "We are 14
countries in SADC. The EU can either fund us as a group or keep its financial
aid." 4 These initial declarations signaled that the SADC, a body founded
AB 2000, Princeton University; JD Candidate 2005, The University of Chicago.
I
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SADC nations are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and
Pact Limits
Zimbabwe. Seychelles has announced its intention to leave the SADC. See Securily
Sovereignty in Southern Africa, SABC News (S Africa) (Aug 26, 2003), available online at
<http://www.sabcnews.com/africa/southern africa/0,2172,64676,00.html> (visited Mar 30,
2004).
Beauregard Tromp, SADC Welcomes Mugabe as an Afiican Hero, Mercury (S Africa) 8 (Aug 26,
=

2003), available online at <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set-id=l&click_id=68&art-id
vn20030826061020725C162985> (visited Mar 30, 2004); Arnold Beichman, Moral Myopia, Wash
Times A16 (Oct 2, 2003); Bloody Reforms Backed, Herald Sun (Australia) 34 (Aug 27, 2003).
3

Bloody Reforms Backed, Herald Sun (Australia) at 34 (cited in note 2); Secuaidy Pact Limits Sovereignty in
Southern Africa, SABC News (S Africa) (cited in note 1). Mugabe's detractors cite violence and
vote rigging associated with his contested 2002 re-election, government-sponsored harassment of
dissidents, prosecution of the opposition party leader on charges of treason, and Zimbabwe's
controversial land distribution program where the government seized white-owned farms and
redistributed to landless blacks.
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Manoah Esipisu, African Leaders Rally behind Embattled Zimbabwe, Reuters (Aug 24, 2003), available
online at <http:/www.aegis.com/news/re/2003/RE030833.html> (visited March 11, 2004).
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primarily to achieve economic integration in Southern Africa, was expanding its
role in the international political arena. By the end of the summit, the SADC had
gone one step further, casting its power in explicitly military terms.
On August 26, 2003, the SADC unanimously endorsed a Mutual Defense
Pact ("MDP") that gives each member nation the right to intervene in armed
attacks of the other member nations. The goal of the MDP is to give the SADC
the ability to quell the seemingly endless stream of invasions, civil wars, and turf
battles that have become a fact of life in Southern Africa in the late-twentieth
century. In moving closer to regional security integration, the SADC countries
have explicitly acknowledged their interconnectedness: a security threat to one
country can affect the entire subcontinent. According to Benjamin Mkapa,
SADC chairperson and Tanzania's president, "If your neighbour is unstable, you
will not be stable yourself."5
The MDP represents not only a divergence from the economic-focused
policies of the SADC's past, but also a significant shift away from the region's
traditional respect for sovereignty. Not far removed from colonial rule, the
SADC nations maintain a fierce pride in their independence. They are loath to
give up any of the autonomy that often took years of bitter fighting to attain. Of
course, this commitment to sovereignty has evolved "in the context of immense
political solidarity-Pan Aficanism-that was generated and reinforced by the
struggle against white settler colonialism and apartheid." 6 Yet despite Pan
Africanism and the SADC's stated objective to "evolve common political values,
systems and institutions, ' commentators have long regarded the region's desire
to preserve sovereignty as a fixed component of its political climate and an
intractable barrier to substantive regional integration. In 2001, two scholars went
so far as to say that even though most of the SADC countries' economies are in
poor shape, "not even the least viable state in the region is willing to
contemplate the loss of sovereignty." 8 Given all this, the resolutions and rhetoric
employed at the summit, suggesting a gracious sacrifice of state sovereignty for
the greater good of the region, are especially striking.
This Development will examine the provisions of the SADC's Mutual
Defense Pact, analyze the extent to which it charts a new course for the
organization and affects the SADC's traditional commitment to state

5

6
7

Security Pact Limits Sovereigny in Southern Africa, SABC News (S Africa) (cited in note 1).
David Evans, Peter Holmes, and Ibbo Mandaza, SADC The Cost of Non-Integration 21 (Sapes
1999).
South African Development
Community, Objectives, available online at <http://
www.sadc.int/index.php?lang=english&path=about/background&page=objectives> (visited Mar
11, 2004).
Larry A. Swatuk and Peter Vale, Wy Demorray Is Not Enough: Southern Africa and Human Security, in
Nana Poku, ed, Security and Development in Southern Afica 31, 38 (Praeger 2001).
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sovereignty, and finally, evaluate whether the pact represents a positive, negative,
or negligible change. Section II will place the pact within the context of the
history and past efforts of the SADC. Section III will consider the pact itself,
paying special attention to whether its provisions add up to any cohesive
message. Section IV will discuss whether the pact is a move in the right direction
for Southern Africa.
II. THE SADC's TROUBLED PAST AND ITS DESIRED FUTURE
The precursor to the SADC, the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference ("SADCC"), was established in 1980 by nine member
countries.9 The group's principal objective was to reduce the dependency of the
member countries on South Africa, at that point years away from casting off its
apartheid regime.' ° Regional self-reliance was to be attained through economic
development of each of the SADCC member countries. While the SADCC lent
a powerful voice to the struggle against apartheid, its success with respect to
economic development was limited. Starting in 1987, the organization set out to
redefine itself."
In 1992, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference
became the Southern African Development Community. Along with the shorter
name came ostensible legitimacy: the SADC is based on a legally binding treaty
that was ratified by its member states. 12 Despite the binding nature of the
group's treaty, however, the transformation of the SADCC into the SADC did
not immediately bring about a new direction in policy:
Given that in practice anti-South African sentiment rather than economic
common interests bound the SADCC together, it was hardly surprising that
initially its metamorphosis into SADC was not indicative of a major change
in policy for the international community. Indeed, for the wider
international community, the only significant departure in principle was a
new preference for a dirigiste over a laissez-faire approach: regional
integration was to be driven by a more regimented, interventionist and

centrally directed policy, although the institutional structures and policy
content of this reorientation were not specified. 13
When newly-democratic South Africa joined the SADC in 1994, many in
the organization had high hopes for what the SADC could accomplish. At the
The original members of the SADCC were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Logan Rangasamy, Christopher Mupimpila, and
Meshack M. Khosa, Models of Economic Integration, in Jim Whitman, ed, The Sustainabiliy Challengefor
Southern Afica 41, 46 (Macmillan 2000).
10 Id.
9

In
12

13

Id at 47.
Nana Poku, RegionaliZaion and Security in Southern Africa 99 (Palgrave 2001).
Id at 100.
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time, South Africa's economy was nearly four times as large as the economies of
the other eleven members combined.' 4 The addition of such an economic
heavyweight could bring considerable clout to the SADC. Representatives from
the member nations gathered in Johannesburg in 1995, pledging to create a
common market for Southern Africa "with free trade . . . , free movement of
people and even a single currency."' 5 Then-secretary of the SADC, Kaire
Mbuende, commented that "the countries of southern Africa have the potential
to become a powerful economic block."' 6
Problems inherent to the organization itself, as well as the constant ravages
of war and poverty, impeded the SADC from meeting its goals. The bulk of
South Africa's trade was with nations outside of the southern African region;
consequently, little of its wealth seeped into the other SADC countries. The
organization's heavy reliance on external funding restricted the SADC's ability to
control its agenda. The SADC had few enforcement mechanisms to ensure that
its members respected the trade, drug-smuggling, and water-sharing agreements
they had signed.' 7 Civil wars and political coups kept several countries in a state
of economic stagnation. Although the SADC had some success in obtaining aid
from the World Bank and in rehabilitating the transportation and
communication infrastructure of the region, indicators of economic
performance do not demonstrate that the SADC has in any significant way
improved the economies of its member states. 8
Without the SADC, its member countries might have fared even worse,
but this counterfactual possibility cannot console the SADC's leaders very much.
They are surely aware that the SADC is considered a largely unproductive
organization, despite its hopes of being taken seriously as a world player.
Perhaps, then, the group's appeal to military force is merely an effort to
command attention and respect in the international political sphere. The
ramped-up commitment to Southern African solidarity may also be intended to
reinvigorate SADC policy in its non-military areas-in trade and environmental
policy, for instance. Under this view of the pact, its relevance has very little to do
with military objectives. Rather, the pact's role is to convey to the world how the
SADC views itself, and to assert a strong philosophy of integration that will aid
the organization in its primary focus areas.
Lending support to this theory is the fact that although the pact purports
to open the door for swift military action, it does not create a new independent

15

Southern Africa Dreams of Unity, Economist 35 (Sept 2, 1995).
Id.
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Id.
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Mr. Mugabe, Please Be Nice, Economist 40 aan 19, 2002).
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Poku, RegionaliZation and Securily in SouthernAfrica at 103-04 (cited in note 12).
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peacekeeping force.'9 However, the African Union ("AU"), a larger
intergovernmental organization than the SADC, has been discussing the
prospect of setting up a peacekeeping force. The SADC pact could lay the
groundwork for the creation of an SADC contingent to the AU force. g
Furthermore, even though the pact does not authorize a single SADC
military force, it contains an entire article related to defense cooperation. The
article provides that parties to the pact will "co-operate in defence matters and
facilitate interaction among their armed forces and defence-related industries.'
It specifically authorizes joint military exercises, the exchange of military
intelligence and information in all matters relevant to security, and joint
development of defense equipment. 22 These procedures, coupled with the
statement of intent to cooperate, may be sufficient to make collective military
action through the SADC a reality.
The pact flows from the SADC's establishment, in 1996,23 of the SADC
Organ for Politics, Defence and Security ("Organ"), a security body charged
with preventing the breakdown of law and order, both between and within
member countries.2 4 The declaration establishing the Organ said little about
implementation, 25 hindering the Organ from meeting its ambitious aims. The
stated objective of the MDP is "to operationalise the mechanisms of the Organ
for mutual cooperation in defence and security matters. 2 6 The presence of preexisting channels within the SADC should facilitate the MDP's security goals.
In sum, while the Mutual Defense Pact is more than the SADC's stab at
being taken seriously, it remains unclear whether the signing of the pact itself
will make the SADC appreciably more likely to take military action. 27 At the very
least, the MDP expresses the will of the SADC to make preparations for future
military activity, be it through an AU standby force or through collective action
of individual countries' armies. The prior existence of the SADC Organ shows
19
20

21

22

Security PactI 'mits Sovereignty in Southern Africa, SABC News (S Africa) (cited in note 1).
Southern Africa Documentation and Cooperation Centre, SADC States to Sign Defence Pact (Aug
22, 2003), available online at <http://www.sadocc.at/news/2003-234.shtml> (visited Mar 11,
2004).
online
at
2003),
available
art
9
(Aug 26,
Defence
Pact
SADC Mutual
(visited Mar 11,
<http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unityto-union/pdfs/sadc/defpact.pdf>
2004).
Id.

23 Fredrik S6derbaum, The Dynamics of Security and Development Regionalism in Southern Africa, in Poku,
24
25

ed, Securit and Development in Southern Africa 103, 106 (cited in note 8).
Southern Africa: Mutual Defence Pact Launched, IRiNNews.org (Aug 27, 2003), available online at
<http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID-36230> (visited Mar 11, 2004).
S6derbaum, The Dynamics of Security and Development Regionalism at 107 (cited in note 23).

26

SADC Mutual Defence Pact art 2 (cited in note 21).

27

At the time of this writing, the SADC has taken no action pursuant to the MDP.
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that security integration has been one of the organization's priorities for some
time. The pact takes an important step toward bringing the SADC's security
goals to fruition.
III. THE MUTUAL DEFENSE PACT
The Mutual Defense Pact is a short (seven-page) document that principally
relates general sentiments about security and cooperation rather than laying out
concrete plans. However, much can be gleaned about the SADC's intentions
from the pact's relatively few provisions. Article 4, entitled "Military
Preparedness," provides that the member nations of the SADC will "individually
and collectively, by means of continuous co-operation and assistance, maintain
and develop their individual and collective self-defence capacity to maintain
peace, stability and security." The key article in the pact is Article 6, entitled
"Collective Self-Defence and Collective Action":
1. An armed attack against a State Party [an SADC member nation]
shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and such
an attack shall be met with immediate collective action.
2. Collective action shall be mandated by Summit on the
recommendation of the Organ.
3. Each State Party shall participate in such collective action in any
manner it deems appropriate.
4. Any such armed attack, and measures taken in response thereto,
shall immediately be reported to the Peace and Security Council of
the African Union and the Security Council of the United
29
Nations.
There are a few important things to note about Article 6. First, the first
clause does not explicitly differentiate among different kinds of armed forces
that could attack a State Party. Presumably, an invading army and a rebelling
group within the country would be considered equally threatening to regional
security under the pact and could both provoke collective action. Despite a lack
of clarity in the text, Kathryn Sturman, a senior researcher at the Institute for
Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa, argues that the pact has a traditional
focus on protecting the region of Southern Africa from military threats from
outside the region.30 Sturman questions "whether that's the most appropriate
kind of security cooperation Southern Africa needs. The people of Southern
Africa face greater threats from their own government, for example Zimbabwe,
than they do from any external military threats.'

28

SADC Mutual Defence Pact art 4 (cited in note 21).

29

Id art 6 (emphasis omitted).

30

Southern Africa: Mutual Defence PactLauncbed, IRINNews.org (cited in note 24).

31

Id.
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Although comments made by SADC leaders suggest that external
aggression was an important concern, little in the text itself demands the
conclusion that Sturman draws.3 2 In fact, the South African Broadcasting
Corporation ("SABC") News reports that SADC officials hope the pact will be
used to end civil war in member states.33 Considering the frequency of civil war
in the region and the current political crisis in Zimbabwe, whether the MDP is
applicable to internal disputes is a crucial issue. If the SADC was seeking to limit
the pact to invasions from outside Southern Africa, it needed to use more
specific language to do so.
Second, the MDP is not as binding as the NATO system in that it does not
view an attack on one as an attack on all. Rather, it considers an attack a
general "threat to regional peace and security" which presses each State Party to
decide for itself how it will participate in the collective response.35 South African
Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad commented that after the SADC decides
that intervention
is warranted, states "can respond according to their
36
possibilities."
This flexible approach was a change from a previous draft of Article 6,
which Zimbabwe supported. That version would have states "immediately
respond in the event of an attack on a fellow SADC member country. 3 7 The
ability of individual states to respond to an attack in whatever way they deem
appropriate conflicts with the purpose of the pact-to facilitate collective action.
Article 6 was likely softened to ameliorate concerns of countries fearful that the
SADC would take away all their autonomy over military matters.38
The tension between sovereignty and solidarity runs through the pact. For
example, in the Preamble, the nations resolve "to unite our efforts towards
collective self-defence and the preservation of peace and stability" but also to
recognize "the sovereign equality of all States and their intention to strengthen
the bonds that exist amongst them on the basis of respect for their

32

Article 1 of the MDP defines "armed attack" as "the use of military force in violation of the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of a State Party." This definition suggests
invasion by a force from outside the attacked country, but a rebel group within a country could
also be seen to challenge, for example, a country's sovereignty. SADC Mutual Defence Pact art
1(2) (cited in note 21).

33

Securioy Pactlimits Sovereignty in SouthernAfrica, SABC News (S Africa) (cited in note 1).

34

SADC States to Sign Defence Pact (cited in note 20); Southern Africa: Mutual Defence Pact Launched,
IRINNews.org (cited in note 24).

35

36

SADC Mutual Defence Pact art 6 (cited in note 21).
SADC States to Sign Defence Pact (cited in note 20).

37

Southern Africa: Mutual Defence PactLaunched, IRINNews.org (cited in note 24).

38

It has been reported that South Africa was largely responsible for the change in Article 6. See
SADC States to Sign Defence Pact (cited in note 20).
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independence and non-interference in their internal affairs." 39 It is apparent
from these passages that the framers of the MDP understood the inherent
challenges to sovereignty any collective agreement brings. An entire articleArticle 7-is dedicated to the principle of non-interference:
1. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 11 (2) of the
Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, State
Parties undertake to respect one another's territorial integrity and
sovereignty and, in particular, observe the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of one another.
2. No action shall be taken to assist any State Party in terms of this
Pact, save at the State Party's own request or with its consent,
that action needs to be taken in
except where the Summit decides
40
accordance with the Protocol.
Article 7 implies that the SADC's function in approving intervention is to
restore constitutional order, as opposed to, for instance, meddling with the
attacked country's political system. But whether the pact's strong articulation of
non-interference is sustainable is unclear: there is a fine line between stabilizing a
country and interfering in its internal affairs. Above all, the fact that the SADC
included Article 7 indicates that the pact is an attempt to stake out a middle
ground between sovereignty and solidarity, as opposed to a wholesale rebuke of
the countries' traditional, nationalist outlook.
Another tension running through the pact is found in its simultaneous
deference to other intergovernmental organizations, such as the UN, and its
implied independence from those organizations. The Preamble reaffirms the
SADC's "commitment to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,"
as well as those of the African Union.4 1 Moreover, the pact provides that it "shall
not derogate from the responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for
the maintenance of international peace and security. 42 However, Article 6 states
that "any... armed attack, and measures taken in response thereto, shall immediately
be reported" to the AU and to the UN. 43 There is no stated requirement in the
pact to discuss a member nation's predicament with the UN before the SADC
approves force. To the contrary, Article 6's requirement to inform the UN of
what measures have been taken indicates that the UN will not necessarily be
consulted first. In a situation where SADC action is not in accordance with UN
wishes, the pact suggests that the SADC may pursue its own goals.
Taken as a whole, the provisions of the MDP assert a strong message of
solidarity, while preserving a measure of respect for the sovereignty of the
39

SADC Mutual Defence Pact at Preamble (cited in note 21).

40

Id art 7.

41

Id.

42

Id art 15(4).

43

Id art 6(4) (emphasis added).
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member states and for the power of the UN and the AU. The significant danger
in such a concessionary tone is that all of the thoughtfully considered
compromises will ultimately cancel each other out. Whether the SADC is
capable of skirting the sharp edge between solidarity and sovereignty, between
autonomy from other organizations and dependence on them, remains to be
seen.
IV.

IS THE MUTUAL DEFENSE PACT A GOOD THING
FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA?

With few notable exceptions, Southern Africa is in the same place it was in
1992, when the SADC was formed. South Africa still towers over the rest of the
region in productivity; most other nations' economic systems are in dire straits.
Several member states are politically corrupt or unstable. 44 A massive percentage
of the population is infected with HIV. The steady threat of violence stifles
foreign investment and keeps the region's inhabitants in deep poverty. Without
continuous peace and security, all the good intentions in the world cannot make
the SADC an organization capable of affecting real change.
The decision of the SADC to put real teeth behind its call to solidarity
through collective suppression of threats to security is a move in the right
direction. The MDP pact recognizes, rightly, that the problems of one country in
Southern Africa are the problems of the other countries. Successful use of the
pact to restore stability will allow the SADC to concentrate its energies on
shoring up the region's economies, its primary task.
However, there exists a significant danger that the pact will have only
symbolic value if the SADC does not strengthen certain provisions and clarify
several ambiguities in the text. First, the SADC should articulate the procedures
and criteria that will govern its decision to use force. It must develop guidelines
for answering the important questions: When is an attack serious enough to
warrant a response? Should the response encompass diplomatic and military
action, or just military action? As it stands, the pact is remarkably vague on these
issues. South Africa's Deputy Foreign Minister has said only that if "there is an

44

While leaders of the SADC have stated their concern that the crisis in Zimbabwe will have a
negative impact on their countries, they have been unwilling to take a real stand against Mugabe.
Members of the SADC have pursued a policy of quiet diplomacy toward Zimbabwe-asking
Mugabe to enter into peace talks with Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the opposition group
Movement for Democratic Change ("MDC"), and pressing Mugabe to honor a fair election. See
Jan Raath, Mugabe Partj Is Forced into Talks uith Opposiion, Times (UK) (Apr 9, 2002); Michael
Dynes, Afican Leaders Let Mugabe Off Hook, Times (UK) (Jan 15, 2002). SADC nations have in
polite terms blamed Mugabe for his country's economic collapse. See The Pressure Builds, 360
Economist 39 (Sept 15, 2001). But the SADC has failed to speak out against the rampant political
repression in Zimbabwe and has maintained a united front against Western criticism of Mugabe,
as evidenced by the organization's stance at the annual summit.
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external aggression then the whole process would be set into motion by which
SADC will then
take a decision whether the aggression warrants a collective
'5
intervention."
Second, the fact that each member state can participate in an intervention
"in any manner it deems appropriate" renders the likelihood of substantive
collective action dubious. The SADC need not take the hard-line approach of
NATO-construing an attack on one country as an attack on all-in order to
arrive at a plan that all members will follow. A smaller group within the SADC
whose responsibility is to order collective intervention, a body similar to the
UN's Security Council, should take input from all member states and settle on a
mutually satisfactory course of action. The SADC should also consider putting
in place incentives to ensure that the member states comply with the plan. The
reason the SADC chose to allow member states to decide for themselves how to
proceed is clear: it did not want to sacrifice the sovereignty of its member states
to the decision of the group. But military force is precisely the area where a
coordinated effort, as opposed to uneven participation, is essential.
Most importantly, the pact does not spell out whether it applies to both
invasions from outside the attacked country and insurrection from within. There
is much confusion in the press and among scholars on this issue, and the SADC
must make its intentions clear. Assuming the pact covers internal attacks, the
SADC must elaborate which considerations should inform the decision of
whether to respond. For instance, does the pact authorize force when the
attacked member nation is ruled by a corrupt dictator who is responsible for
gross human rights violations and the attacking party is a group trying to
overturn the dictatorship in favor of democracy? Will that attack be considered a
threat to regional peace and security regardless of its motives? The current
political crisis in Zimbabwe may develop in such a way as to force the SADC to
confront these questions in the near future. How the SADC addresses
Zimbabwe will in large part determine whether its critics continue to think of it
as an unproductive club of corrupt governments or as a meaningful force for
peace and prosperity in the region.
The MDP's applicability to internal attacks must be considered in the
context of one of the principles espoused in the MDP's Preamble. The member
states pledged "to defend and safeguard the freedom of our peoples and their
civilisation, as well as their individual liberties and the rule of law., 46 Given this
lofty goal, the pact's subtextual commitment to rush to the aid of any besieged
member nation, regardless of its government's record, is very troubling. It
suggests that the pact could neglect concerns about abuses by the Zimbabwean
government, for example, in its rush to preserve political stability.
45
46

Southern Afnca: Mutual Defence PactLaunched, IRINNews.org (cited in note 24).
SADC Mutual Defence Pact at Preamble (cited in note 21).
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Moreover, such a resolutely instrumentalist approach is contrary to the
aims of the Organ, a body the pact is meant to operationalize. "Military
confidence, conflict prevention and resolution, [and] political stability" are some
of the Organ's key tenets.47 Certainly the pact is directed at furthering these
goals. But in addition, the principles of the Organ:
indicate a growing commitment at the official level not only to a regional
security complex but to one that adheres to "new" security and "new"
regionalism axioms and goals, with promises to work toward the protection
of human rights, democracy, rule of law, and economic
and/or promotion
48
development.
The SADC must make clear that it will continue to respect democracy, the rule
of law, and human rights in its quest for security in Southern Africa. These
values should not be sacrificed for security, but rather should be considered
integral components of security. The pact should explicitly incorporate a
balancing test that asks whether force on behalf of a particular government will
effectuate the larger goals of prosperity, liberty, and security which underlie the
organization.
V. CONCLUSION
It is too soon to tell if the SADC's MDP will enable the organization to act
effectively in the face of destabilizing events. To make the pact functional,
SADC countries will have to overcome historical intra-group tensions as well as
the fear of losing their sovereignty to the group effort. Regardless of its
immediate effect, the pact makes real inroads toward putting the concept of
solidarity into practice. A stronger and more detailed articulation of the pact will
improve the likelihood of security in Southern Africa.

47
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S6derbaum, The Dynamics of Securiy and Development Regionalism at 106 (cited in note 23).
Sandra J. MacLean, Peace-Building and the New Regionalism in Southern Africa, in Poku, ed, Securiy and
Development in Southern Africa 123, 132 (cited in note 8).
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